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Evidence
Marc T. Treadwell"
I.

INTRODUCTION

The survey period saw a large number of cases raising significant
evidentiary issues. Two areas in particular should be noted and are
discussed in detail below. First, criminal lawyers should be aware of the
supreme court's reinterpretation of Cuzzort v. State,' a landmark
decision creating a broad exception to the hearsay rule for prior
consistent statements.2 Second, all trial lawyers should be aware that
the court of appeals continues to flirt with the idea of requiring parties
to tender expert witnesses to the court for certification that they are, in
fact, qualified to render expert testimony. As in past evidence surveys,
this year's discussion of evidence decisions will be organized in the
format of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
II.

OBJECTIONS

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the failure of a party to object
to evidence precludes that party from raising that issue on appeal unless
the admission of the evidence constitutes "plain error."' During the
survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals, at least according to one
judge, came perilously close to adopting the plain error rule in Georgia.
In Putnam v. State,' a social worker testified at defendant's child
molestation trial that she believed the victim had been molested, she
had confirmed the molestation, and the Department of Family and
Children Services placed defendant's name in a database of child abusers

* Partner in the firm of Chambless, Higdon & Carson, Macon, Georgia. Valdosta State
University (B.A., 1978); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1981). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 254 Ga. 745, 334 S.E.2d 661 (1985).
2. Id. at 745, 334 S.E.2d at 661.
3. FED. R. EVID. 103.
4. 231 Ga. App. 190, 498 S.E.2d 340 (1998).
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because the Department concluded also that the victim had been
abused.5 The court of appeals easily concluded this testimony was
inadmissible, noting that it has been "held repeatedly and unequivocally
that a witness may not express his or her opinion as to whether a child
has been molested."' The lack of an objection, however, presented a
problem. Normally the failure to object, no matter how obviously
inadmissible the evidence, waives a party's right to appeal the admission
of the evidence. However, the court of appeals, citing various authorities, concluded the testimony "was harmful and reversible error, even in
the absence of an objection."7
It does seem the majority was employing a "plain error" analysis, and
in a special concurrence, Judge Beasley criticized the majority for
"shortcutting the normal process by using the 'plain error' rule which the
United States Supreme Court created ...
According to Judge
Beasley, no Georgia case had applied the plain error rule in the context
of inadmissible opinion testimony on the ultimate issue to be decided by
the jury.9 She made it clear that by concurring specially in the
judgment, the majority's opinion had no precedential effect.1"
Apparently, Judge Beasley was concerned with the majority's
pronouncement that the admission of the testimony was so clearly
erroneous that the conviction should be overturned notwithstanding the
absence of an objection, and Judge Beasley traced the courts' rather
inconsistent treatment of this issue. 1 It seems that Judge Beasley's
point is that in this area of the law, no evidence can be so clearly
erroneous as to be plainly inadmissible.
III.

JUDICIAL NOTICE

In NationsBank, N.A. (South) v. Thcker," plaintiff claimed the trial
court erred in failing to take judicial notice of an exhibit to his complaint. Plaintiff sued defendant to collect a debt and attorney fees

5. Id. at 190, 498 S.E.2d at 340.
6. Id. at 191, 498 S.E.2d at 342.
7. Id. at 193, 498 S.E.2d at 344. The court of appeals relied heavily on Mindock v.
State, 187 Ga. App. 508, 370 S.E.2d 670 (1988) and Boatwright v. State, 193 Ga. App. 141,
387 S.E.2d 386 (1989). For a discussion of Mindock v. State and Boatwright v. State, see
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 41 MERCER L. REV. 175, 176 (1989) and Marc T. Treadwell,
Evidence, 42 MERCER L. REV. 223, 224 (1990).
8. 231 Ga. App. at 194, 498 S.E.2d at 344 (Beasley, J., concurring).
9. Id.
10. Id. See also Georgia Court of Appeals Rule 33(a).
11. This issue, whether opinion testimony that a child was or was not molested, has
been termed the Butler/Allison debate by the author and is discussed in more detail below.
12. 231 Ga. App. 622, 500 S.E.2d 378 (1998).
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incurred in the collection of the debt. However, plaintiff rested its case
without tendering evidence of the notice required by O.C.G.A. section 131-11 to recover attorney fees in a suit on a note. When the trial court
refused to allow plaintiff to reopen its case, plaintiff asked the court to
take judicial notice of an exhibit to the complaint, which plaintiff argued
was a copy of the required notice.' 3 The trial court refused. 4 On
appeal, the court of appeals acknowledged that a trial court, upon timnely
request, may take judicial notice of the pleadings in an action pending
before the court. 5 Thus, the court of appeals acknowledged that the
trial court could have taken judicial notice of plaintiff's complaint,
including exhibits. However, the court could not judicially notice that
the "exhibit was admissible, relevant, identified, authenticated, or the
highest and best evidence, because such issues are a matter of proof that
cannot be judicially noticed." 6 Thus, while the trial court could have
taken judicial notice that the exhibit was attached to the complaint, this
did not meet plaintiff's burden of proving it had provided the requisite
notice to defendant.
The court of appeals also held during the survey period that a court
cannot take judicial notice of county and municipal ordinances. 7
IV.

PRESUMPTIONS

O.C.G.A. section 24-4-23 creates, under certain circumstances, a
presumption when a party fails to respond to a letter." Specifically,
when in the ordinary course of business good faith requires an answer,
it is the duty of the party receiving a letter to answer within a reasonable time. 9 If he doesn't "he is presumed to admit the propriety of the
acts mentioned in the letter ... and to adopt them." 20 In Godwin v.
Caldwell,2 defendant contended the court improperly refused to charge
this code section.22 The court of appeals agreed that the evidence was
sufficient to establish that the parties "were involved in a course of
business to which this statute would apply."23 However, the court held

13. Id. at 622, 500 S.E.2d at 380.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 623, 500 S.E.2d at 380.
16. Id., 500 S.E.2d at 381.
17. Honiker v. State, 230 Ga. App. 597, 598, 497 S.E.2d 70, 71 (1998); Reed v. State,
229 Ga. App. 817, 818, 495 S.E.2d 313, 314 (1997).
18. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-23 (1995).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 231 Ga. App. 523, 500 S.E.2d 49 (1998).
22. Id. at 524, 500 S.E.2d at 50.
23. Id.
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the statute, by itself, was an incomplete statement of law. 24 Because
the presumption was one of fact, rather than a presumption of law, it
was subject to explanation. 25
Therefore, to be a correct charge,
defendant should have requested the trial court to charge, in addition to
the statute, that the presumption created by the statute could be
rebutted.26
V.
A.

RELEVANCY

Relevancy of Extrinsic Act Evidence

In the eleven years the author has surveyed Georgia appellate
decisions, the determination of the relevancy of extrinsic act evidence
has been the single-most frequently addressed evidentiary issue.
Accordingly, some background discussion is appropriate. Evidence is
extrinsic when it concerns conduct on occasions other than the one at
issue. As a general rule, extrinsic act evidence is inadmissible. Like the
rule against hearsay, however, the rule against extrinsic act evidence is
known more for its exceptions than its flat prohibition. Extrinsic act
evidence may be admissible for a substantive purpose, such as when a
prosecutor tenders evidence of a similar transaction, usually a prior
criminal offense, to prove a defendant's motive in committing the
charged offense. Or extrinsic act evidence may be used to impeach or
bolster a witness, such as evidence of a felony conviction to impeach a
witness's character. Sometimes evidence that seems extrinsic is not
subjected to extrinsic act evidence analysis. For example, the res gestae
doctrine, although typically thought of as an exception to the rule
against hearsay, is often used to admit evidence which, although not
directly probative of the transaction at issue, is close enough, temporally,
to be admitted as evidence of the transaction.
For years, Georgia courts have routinely and liberally admitted, for
substantive purposes, evidence of similar but totally unrelated transactions, usually prior offenses, in criminal cases. However, as discussed
in previous surveys, the Georgia Supreme Court in Stephens v. State27
and Williams v. State2" tightened the rules governing the admissibility
of similar transaction evidence in criminal cases. 9 In Stephens the

24. Id. at 525, 500 S.E.2d at 50.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 261 Ga. 467, 405 S.E.2d 483 (1991).
28. 261 Ga. 640, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991).
29. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 45 MERCER L. REV. 229, 231 (1994); Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 44 MERCER L. REV. 213, 216-20 (1993).
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supreme court held that the prosecution cannot rely solely on a certified
copy of a prior conviction when seeking to use that conviction as similar
transaction evidence.3 ° Rather, the prosecution must offer evidence
proving the requisite degree of similarity or connection between the
extrinsic act and the charged offense.3 ' In Williams the supreme court,
in a dramatic departure from prior practice, held that the prosecution
must prove prior to trial three elements before similar transaction
evidence can be admitted. 2 First, the prosecution must prove the
relevance of the independent transaction to a legitimate issue. 3
Second, the prosecution must prove the defendant committed the
independent offense or act.34 Third, the prosecution must prove a
sufficient connection or similarity between the prior act or offense and
the charged offense. 35 The trial court must then make a specific
determination that the prosecution has carried its burden of proving
each of the three elements.36
Williams and Stephens, notwithstanding, courts routinely and liberally
continue to admit similar transaction evidence in criminal cases, and
that was largely the case during the current survey period. 37 However,
in King v. State,35 the court of appeals concluded that the trial court
went too far.39 In King defendant contended the trial court improperly
admitted his 1984 convictions for the sale of methamphetamine in his
1997 trial for the existence of methamphetamine in his bodily fluid.4 °
The court of appeals agreed and reversed.4' The court reasoned that
there must be some logical connection between the extrinsic offense and
the charged offense when the prosecution seeks to offer the extrinsic
offense as similar transaction evidence. 42 The connection must be such

30. 261 Ga. at 468, 405 S.E.2d at 485.
31. Id., 405 S.E.2d at 485-86.
32. 261 Ga. at 642, 409 S.E.2d at 651.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Wayne v. State, 269 Ga. 36, 38, 495 S.E.2d 39, 40 (1998); Swift v. State, 229
Ga. App. 772, 775-76, 495 S.E.2d 109, 113 (1997); McBee v. State, 228 Ga. App. 16, 491
S.E.2d 97 (1997); Dunbar v. State, 228 Ga. App. 104, 491 S.E.2d 166 (1997). As discussed
in last year's survey, some supreme court justices would limit the use of similar transaction
evidence but they are still the minority. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 48 MERCER L.
REV. 323, 327-29 (1996).
38. 230 Ga. App. 301, 496 S.E.2d 312 (1998).
39. Id. at 304, 496 S.E.2d at 314.
40. Id. at 301-02, 496 S.E.2d at 313.
41. Id. at 304, 496 S.E.2d at 315.
42. Id. at 302, 496 S.E.2d at 313.
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that "proof of the separate offense establishes the offense for which the
accused is on trial."43 While both offenses involved methamphetamine,
the extrinsic offense involved the sale of the drug, not the use of the
drug. Defendant contended the drug was placed in his coffee and thus,
he did not possess the requisite criminal intent." Although this
certainly made intent an issue, it did not necessarily follow that the
extrinsic offenses were admissible.4 5 The court noted that the prosecution could not explain how the sale of drugs in 1984 would prove the
intent to use drugs. 41 "We note that'if it were permissible to admit the
prior drug sales in the trial of this case, then any earlier drug offenses
47
would be admissible in any drug trial. That is not yet our law."
Another type of extrinsic act evidence is evidence of prior difficulties
between a defendant and his victim. In Maxwell v. State," the
supreme court held that prior difficulties evidence fell within the scope
of Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3, which requires the prosecution to
provide the defendant with notice of its intent to tender such evidence
and the trial court to convene a hearing to establish whether the
prosecution can make its Williams showing. 49 The court revisited
Maxwell during the survey period in Wall v. State.0 In Wall defendant
argued the trial court improperly admitted prior difficulties evidence
because the prosecution did not give the required Rule 31.3 notice.51
The court acknowledged its decision in Maxwell but noted that the
supreme court and the court of appeals had "repeatedly examined" this
issue since Maxwell, and, with only one exception, had affirmed the
admission of prior difficulties evidence even though the prosecution and
the trial court did not comply with Rule 31.3.52 Generally, the court
found there was no harmful error.53 The reason for this, the court
concluded is that "inherent in [prior difficulties evidence] are the three
affirmative showings the State must make and the trial court must find
under Maxwell before the evidence may be admitted . . . . 4 Thus, a
Rule 31.3 hearing would be superfluous.55 The court stated, "[aiccord-

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 303, 496 S.E.2d at 314.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 304, 496 S.E.2d at 314-15.
262 Ga. 73, 414 S.E.2d 470 (1992).
Id. at 75, 414 S.E.2d at 473.
269 Ga. 506, 500 S.E.2d 904 (1998).
Id. at 507, 500 S.E.2d at 906.
Id. at 508, 500 S.E.2d at 906-07.
Id. at 510, 500 S.E.2d at 908.
Id. at 509, 500 S.E.2d at 907.
Id.

1998]

EVIDENCE

235

ingly, we overrule the holding in Maxwell and its progeny that a trial
court must conduct a pre-trial hearing and make certain findings before
evidence of prior difficulties between the defendant and the victim can
be admitted at trial."5 6
Justice Fletcher, joined by Justice Sears, concurred specially.57
Justice Fletcher agreed that prior difficulties evidence should not be
subject to the procedural requirements for similar transaction evidence."8 It does not necessarily follow, Justice Fletcher warned, that
prior difficulties evidence is always admissible.5 9 Consistent with his
concerns about the liberal admission of similar transaction evidence,
Justice Fletcher noted that a trial court still should consider whether the
probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.6s
The scope of admissible extrinsic act evidence is narrower in civil cases
than in criminal cases. At first glance this seems odd; surely courts
should be more reluctant to admit highly prejudicial extrinsic act
evidence in criminal cases, where freedom and sometimes life are at
stake, than in civil cases. There is, however, a logical basis for this
disparate treatment. Civil cases rarely involve issues of intent, motive,
scheme, or other issues that come in to play in cases involving intentional misconduct. Rather, civil cases typically involve nonintentional
conduct such as negligence. Thus, evidence of a prior automobile
accident in a negligence case involving an unrelated subsequent accident
would serve only to prove the improper and prejudicial point that a
defendant, because he was negligent on a prior occasion, was more likely
negligent on the occasion at issue. In a criminal case, on the other hand,
evidence of a prior burglary involving facts similar to the charged offense
may tend to prove the defendant's motive, intent, or plan in committing
the charged offense. If so, the prosecution is not using the prior
transaction to show a defendant's propensity to engage in criminal
conduct, but rather is using the evidence as proof of a legitimate issue,
e.g., motive, intent, or plan. Generally, however, the rule governing the
admissibility of extrinsic act evidence is the same for both criminal and
civil cases. Evidence of similar or related transactions is not admissible
to prove that a person acted in conformity with some prior conduct, but

56. Id.
57. Id. at 510, 500 S.E.2d at 908.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. As reported in the past two surveys, Justice Fletcher and Justice Sears would
sharply curtail the use of similar transaction evidence. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence,
49 MERCER L. REV. 149, 154-56 (1997); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 48 MERCER L. REV.
323, 348-50 (1996).
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may be admissible to prove legitimate issues such as identity, motive,
plan, scheme, or bent of mind, all of which are generally not relevant
issues in a civil case, as compared to such issues as notice or course of
conduct which are more likely to be issues in a civil case.
For example, in a product liability case, a manufacturer's notice of a
defect is often at issue. The court of appeals dealt with the issue of
extrinsic act evidence offered to prove notice in Rose v.Figgie International, Inc. 6 1 In Rose plaintiff contended she was injured when a fire
extinguisher manufactured by defendant spontaneously exploded. The
trial court granted the manufacturer's motion in limine to exclude
evidence of other spontaneous explosions of the same model fire
extinguisher and to exclude evidence of a subsequent recall of that model
extinguisher."
The trial court reasoned that because the fire extinguisher was not available (it had been thrown away by an apartment
complex maintenance man), plaintiff could not prove the fire extinguisher had the same manufacturing defect that was involved in the other
incidents and the recall notice. Thus, the trial court concluded, plaintiff
could not prove the extrinsic incidents were substantially similar to her
incident.6 3 On appeal, the court of appeals agreed that it was plaintiff's
burden to prove that her extinguisher had the same manufacturing
defect as those involved in the other incidents and that were the subject
of the recall. 4 However, the court disagreed with the trial court's
conclusion that plaintiff could not prove substantial similarity because
her fire extinguisher was unavailable.6" It would be sufficient, the
court held, if "circumstantial evidence" established that plaintiff's fire
extinguisher had the same manufacturing defect.66 The court also
rejected the manufacturer's argument that similar incidents are only
admissible in cases involving design defects rather than cases involving
manufacturing defects. 67 While it is true that a design defect necessarily means all products manufactured pursuant to the design would have
the same defect, it is also true that "because a manufacturing defect
involves the use of a systematic process, evidence that some goods
produced during a certain time through a certain process had a defect
that same time
is probative to show that other goods produced during
6
through the same process may also have the defect.",

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

229 Ga. App. 848, 495 S.E.2d 77 (1997).
Id. at 848, 495 S.E.2d 79.
Id. at 848-50, 495 S.E.2d at 79-80.
Id. at 850, 495 S.E.2d at 81.
Id. at 851, 495 S.E.2d at 81.
Id.
Id. at 853, 495 S.E.2d 82-83.
Id.
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The court of appeals decision in Dawson v. Fulton-DeKalb Hospital
Authority6 9 demonstrates why extrinsic act evidence is typically not
admissible in negligence cases. In Dawson plaintiff contended defendant's malpractice caused the death of her ten-year-old son. After a jury
returned a small verdict in her favor, plaintiff appealed, contending,
among other things, that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence
that she failed to bring her child to four scheduled appointments prior
to the surgery that allegedly caused her son's death.70 She argued her
failure to keep these appointments was not relevant to the issue of
whether defendant's subsequent conduct caused her son's death. The
court of appeals agreed, stating "'[a]s a general rule in negligence
actions, evidence of similar acts or omissions is not admissible."''
While it could be argued that evidence of a plaintiff's habit of negligently
caring for her son would be admissible to prove that she subsequently
was negligent in her care of the son, the evidence was not sufficient to
establish "'a fixed and uniform habit. ' ' 7 2 Thus, the trial court erred in
admitting the evidence, but the court of appeals further held that the
error was not harmful.73
B.

Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures

In CSX Transportation,Inc. v. Monhollen,4 defendant claimed the
trial court erroneously admitted evidence of subsequent remedial
measures. In Monhollen plaintiff claimed defendant did not make
respirators available to its workers and, as a result, he was injured when
he inhaled toxic fumes. During cross-examination, an employee of
defendant testified that no respirator program was in place until after
plaintiff had left his employment with defendant.75 The court of
appeals acknowledged that evidence of subsequent remedial measures
is inadmissible in negligence actions in order to demonstrate that a
party was negligent.7" However, such evidence may be admissible for
other purposes.77 Here, the court of appeals held, "the subsequent

69. 227 Ga. App. 715, 490 S.E.2d 142 (1997).
70. Id. at 715-17, 490 S.E.2d 144-46.
71. Id. at 721, 490 S.E.2d at 148 (quoting Goss v. Total Chipping, 220 Ga. App. 643,
644, 469 S.E.2d 855, 858 (1996)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 722, 490 S.E.2d at 149.
74. 229 Ga. App. 516, 494 S.E.2d 202 (1997).
75. Id. at 519-20, 494 S.E.2d at 205-06.
76. Id. at 519, 494 S.E.2d at 206.
77. Id.
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remedial measure evidence falls within the exception of proving a
material fact, i.e., that CSX failed to comply with OSHA's respirator
program requirements while Monhollen was employed with CSX." v8 In
other words, plaintiff wanted to show there was not a respirator program
in place while he was employed by CSX, a fact denied by CSX, by
showing that the program was actually implemented after he stopped
working for CSX. The court held the evidence was admissible for this
purpose.79
C.

Relevancy of PriorSexual Behavior

O.C.G.A. section 24-2-3 prohibits the admission of evidence relating to
the prior sexual behavior of a rape victim unless the behavior directly
involved the accused and the evidence at issue supports an inference
that the accused could have reasonably believed the victim consented to
the sexual activity."0 As discussed in many prior surveys, defendants
have largely been unsuccessful in their attempts to prove their victims'
prior sexual activity. In Herndon v. State,"' it was a defendant who
argued that prior sexual activity, or the lack thereof, was not relevant.
In Herndon the trial court admitted evidence that the alleged rape
victim was a virgin prior to the rape. The prosecution argued this
evidence was relevant to prove the extent of the victim's injuries.8 2 The
court of appeals disagreed and overruled authority suggesting evidence
of a victim's virginity is admissible in a rape prosecution. 3 Unfortunately for defendant, however, the court of appeals ruled the evidence
against defendant8 4was overwhelming and thus, the trial court's error
was not harmless.
VI.

PRIVILEGES

In Spence v. Hamm,"5 the court of appeals dealt rather easily with
the issue of whether privileged attorney-client communications remain
privileged after the death of the client, an issue that the United States
Supreme Court also dealt with, although not with quite the dispatch of

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 520, 494 S.E.2d at 206.
Id.
Id.
232 Ga. App. 129, 499 S.E.2d 918 (1998).
Id. at 132, 499 S.E.2d at 920.
Id., 499 S.E.2d at 921.
Id.
226 Ga. App. 357, 487 S.E.2d 9 (1997).
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the Georgia Court of Appeals. 6 In Spence plaintiffs claimed their
uncle's widow breached an oral contract to make a will making them
beneficiaries of her estate. One of the plaintiffs, an attorney, met with
his uncle in 1968 to finalize a power of attorney. The attorney asked his
uncle whether he needed any further legal assistance, and the uncle
replied he didn't because he and his wife had agreed to retain their
existing mutual will which devised everything to the survivor. However,
the uncle also said his wife had agreed to execute a new will after his
death leaving half of her estate to the uncle's nieces and nephews. The
attorney further testified that when his uncle's wife asked him to draft
such a will he refused because he was a beneficiary. When the uncle's
wife died twenty-five years later, the nieces and nephews learned that
her will left virtually all her estate to her brother and his children.
Plaintiffs' claim was based almost entirely upon the statements of the
attorney/nephew and his secretary.8 7 Noting that the attorney admitted he was acting in his capacity as an attorney rather than as a
nephew, the court held his testimony was inadmissible because it
concerned privileged attorney-client communications."8 Under Georgia
law, this privilege belongs to the client and continues even after the
client's death.89 The court also rejected the argument that the joint
representation exception to the attorney-client privilege rendered the
attorney's testimony admissible.9" The joint representation exception
allows the admission of otherwise privileged communications with an
attorney when the attorney represents two clients who later become
enmeshed in litigation themselves.9 1 In Spence there was no litigation
between the clients and thus the joint representation exception was not
applicable. 92 Finally, the court held defendants were entitled to invoke
the attorney-client privilege because they stood in the place of the uncle's
wife and thus could raise the privilege just as she could if she were
alive.9 3

86. In Swidler & Berlin v. U.S., 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2088 (1998), the Supreme Court held
that the notes of former Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster's attorney were
protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege notwithstanding Mr. Foster's
death.
87. 226 Ga. App. at 357-58, 487 S.E.2d at 10.
88. Id. at 358, 487 S.E.2d at 11.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 359, 487 S.E.2d at 11.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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WITNESSES

Impeachment By Evidence of Conviction

In a landmark decision, the Georgia Supreme Court held in Witcher
v. Pender,94 that in a civil case a witness's general credibility cannot be
impeached with evidence of a First Offender Act 95 conviction.9"
During the current survey period, the supreme court addressed the issue
of whether a defense witness in a criminal trial may be impeached with
evidence that he pled under the First Offender Act. In Matthews v.
State,97 the trial court admitted, over defendant's objection, evidence
that a defense witness had pled guilty, under the First Offender Act, to
an unrelated criminal offense.9" The Act provides that a defendant who
completes first offender probation is "completely exonerate[d]" and "shall
not be considered to have a criminal conviction."99 In Matthews the
court acknowledged that its holding in Witcher was limited to civil
cases.'0 ° However, in view of the clear legislative intent to relieve a
first offender of any stigma of a criminal record, the court extended its
holding in Witcher to criminal cases.' 0 ' "We hold that unless there is
an adjudication of guilt, a witness may not be impeached on general
credibility grounds by evidence of a first offender record."'
This holding, however, presented a new problem for the court. In
Favors v. State, °3 the court held that a defendant could impeach a
prosecution witness with evidence of the witness's First Offender Act
plea. '" Favors, the court in Matthews noted, was based on a criminal
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses.0 5
However, Favors did not address whether a First Offender Act conviction
is admissible to impeach general credibility or whether it is admissible
to impeach a witness's specific testimony by showing bias, motive, or
inconsistency. The court in Matthews concluded there is no constitution-

94. 260 Ga. 248, 392 S.E.2d 6 (1990).
95. O.C.G.A. §§ 42-8-60 to -65 (1997).
96. 260 Ga. at 249, 392 S.E.2d at 8. For a discussion of Witcher v. Pender, see Marc
T. Treadwell, Evidence, 43 MERCER L. REV. 257, 270 (1991).
97. 268 Ga. 798, 493 S.E.2d 136 (1997).
98. Id. at 801, 493 S.E.2d at 140.
99. O.C.G.A. § 42-8-62(a).
100. 268 Ga. at 801, 493 S.E.2d at 140.
101. Id. at 801-02, 493 S.E.2d at 140.
102. Id. at 802, 493 S.E.2d at 140.
103. 234 Ga. 80, 214 S.E.2d 645 (1975).
104. Id. at 87, 214 S.E.2d at 651.
105. 268 Ga. at 802, 493 S.E.2d at 141.
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Nevertheless, Favors
al right to impeach general credibility."°6
sweepingly held that a First Offender Act conviction could be used to
impeach general credibility.' v This, the court in Matthews decided,
went too far.0 8 Accordingly, the court overruled Favors.°9 Although
the court did not say so, this holding is consistent with the holding in
Hightower v. General Motors Corp., that held that evidence of a
First Offender Act conviction may be used in a civil case to disprove or
to contradict a witness's specific testimony but not to impeach his
character generally."'
In Matthews Judge Benham concurred specially and noted his
objection to the overruling of Favors."' Judge Benham argued that
Favors was not applicable because the witness in Favors was a
prosecution witness rather than a defense witness. 3 Moreover, even
if Favors were applicable, Judge Benham argued that a criminal
right to confront a witness by impeaching
defendant has a constitutional
4
his general credibility."
B.

Sequestration of Witnesses
In McNeil v. State,"' defendant, who had been charged with driving
under the influence of alcohol, contended the trial court improperly
sequestered his expert during the presentation of the prosecution's case.
Defendant argued that a party invoking the rule of sequestration is only
entitled to have the witnesses of the opposing party examined out of the
hearing of each other."6 On appeal, the court of appeals agreed that,
"'as a matter of right a party can invoke the "rule" only as to the
witnesses of the opposite party,'" and thus the prosecution was not, as
a matter of right, entitled to the sequestration of defendant's expert
during the prosecution's case." 7 However, a trial court in its discretion may require all witnesses to leave the courtroom during the

106.

107.
108.
109.
110.
S.E.2d
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.

234 Ga. at 87, 214 S.E.2d at 651.
268 Ga. at 803, 493 S.E.2d at 141.
Id.
175 Ga. App. 112, 332 S.E.2d 336 (1985), affd on othergrounds, 255 Ga. 349, 338
426 (1986).
See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 45 MERCER L. REV. 257, 270 (1991).
268 Ga. at 806, 493 S.E.2d at 143.
Id.
Id.
229 Ga. App. 149, 493 S.E.2d 570 (1997).
See O.C.G.A. § 24-9-61 (1995).
229 Ga. App. at 150, 493 S.E.2d at 571.
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presentation of evidence." 8 The court noted that the trial court
considered whether defendant's case would be prejudiced if his expert
were sequestered, and the court found the expert had already reviewed
a hearing transcript containing the arresting officer's testimony." 9
Under these circumstances,
the court held the trial court did not abuse
20

its discretion.

C.

Refreshing Recollection
In Woods v. State,'2 ' the supreme court limited the circumstances
under which a witness's recollection can be refreshed by a document not
prepared by him. In Woods the trial court ruled that defendant could
not refresh a prosecution witness's recollection of events by showing him
a report prepared by a police officer who had interviewed the witness."2 On appeal, the supreme court noted that O.C.G.A. section 249-69 permits a witness to "'refresh and assist his memory by the use of
any written instrument or memorandum ... [,]' and does not require the

written document so used to have been prepared by the witness, so long
as the witness testifies from personal recollection." 12' Thus, the court
concluded the trial court erroneously refused to allow the witness to
refresh his recollection from the officer's report." 4 However, the court
found this error was harmless because defendant's true goal was to use
the report to refresh the witness's recollection in a manner that would
impeach him. 25 The court held this was improper.126 In other
words, a witness cannot be impeached with a writing he did not prepare.
The court disapproved of its holding in Hull v. State"27 that suggested
a witness could be impeached with a properly authenticated police
report. 128 Thus, a party can refresh a witness's recollection with any
document, but if he wants to impeach the witness, he must do so with
a writing prepared or ratified by the witness.
Justice Hunstein, joined by Justices Fletcher and Sears, concurred but
apparently disagreed with the majority's conclusion that a witness could
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Id. at 149, 493 S.E.2d at 571.
Id. at 150, 493 S.E.2d at 571.
269 Ga. 60, 495 S.E.2d 282 (1998).
Id. at 62, 495 S.E.2d at 285.
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265 Ga. 757, 462 S.E.2d 596 (1995).
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not be impeached with a document prepared by a third-party.12 9
Justice Hunstein wrote that a document prepared by a third-party can
be used to impeach a witness if the document is "authenticated by the
proper party."l"'
VIII.
A.

OPINION TESTIMONY

Subject Matter of Expert Testimony

In almost every survey article written by the author since 1988, the
author has attempted to catalogue, and make some sense of, the
numerous cases in which the courts have struggled with whether expert
testimony is admissible to prove or disprove that a child was sexually
abused. Because this struggle emanated from two apparently conflicting
supreme court decisions, State v. Butler"'l and Allison v. State,"' the
author has referred to this struggle as the Butler/Allison debate. In the
1992 survey, the author optimistically reported that the Butler/Allison
debate had been resolved in Harris v. State.133 That report was
woefully premature as evidenced again by several decisions during the
current survey period.
In Hilliard v. State,"3 defendant, who was charged with child
molestation, contended the trial court improperly permitted the victim's
school counselor, after stating her observations of the victim, to testify
she believed the victim had been molested." 5 The court of appeals
agreed and reversed. 136 The court first noted the general rule that a
witness may not give his opinion on the existence of a fact, i.e., whether
the child has been abused, unless the inference to be drawn is beyond
the ken of jurors."17 The court acknowledged, however, that the "case
law is in stark conflict concerning application of this rule."" 8 The
court then revisited Butler,Allison, and their progeny." 9 The determinative factor in these cases, the court of appeals reasoned, was whether
the opinion testimony was based on the victim's credibility, which would
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Id. at 64-65, 495 S.E.2d at 286.
Id. at 64, 495 S.E.2d at 286.
256 Ga. 448, 349 S.E.2d 684 (1986).
256 Ga. 851, 353 S.E.2d 805 (1987).
261 Ga. 386, 405 S.E.2d 482 (1991).
226 Ga. App. 478, 487 S.E.2d 81 (1997).
Id. at 478, 487 S.E.2d at 82.
Id.
Id., 487 S.E.2d at 83.
Id. at 479, 487 S.E.2d at 82.
Id., 487 S.E.2d at 83.
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be impermissible, rather than the witness's expertise. 14 The question,
the court continued, was whether the jury needed the counselor's opinion
testimony, which was based on her interview of the victim, to establish
the victim was molested or whether the jury could have answered this
Put this way, the outcome was clear; certainly
question for itself.'
a school counselor relying simply on her observations could not bring
substantially more expertise to bear on the issue of whether the victim
had been molested than the jury could. The court viewed Harris to be
the supreme court's most recent pronouncement on this issue and found
Harris and Allison definitive. 42 If, as in Harris, a physician could not
testify that a child was molested based upon his physical examination
of the child, then a counselor should not be allowed to testify, based only
on observations and analysis, that a child has been4 molested. Simply
put, the issue was not beyond the ken of the jurors. 1
The court of appeals reached a similar decision in another criminal
1
appeal that did not involve child molestation. In Adams v. State, 4
the prosecution charged defendant with participating in a complex plan
to steal timber. As a part of its case, the prosecutor elicited testimony
from a Georgia Bureau of Investigation agent who investigated the
alleged thefts. Prior to testifying about the details of his investigation
he was asked to give "'some general statements. ' 1 45 He then proceed-

ed to testify that tracts sold by defendant "'fit the schemes"' of fraudu146
lent transactions and other conclusions based on his investigation.
Another witness, a private investigator retained by the company that
was defrauded, was qualified as an expert and proceeded to testify that
defendants
committed theft and were engaged in a criminal conspira47
cy. 1

The court held the admission of this testimony was error. 14 The
testimony was nothing more than conclusions that the jurors, upon being
provided with the facts, could have drawn for themselves. 149 Moreover,
the fact that the State subsequently presented the facts did not render
the testimony harmless. 50
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Id. at 479-80, 487 S.E.2d at 83.
Id. at 481, 487 S.E.2d at 84.
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231 Ga. App. 279, 499 S.E.2d 105 (1998).
Id. at 283, 499 S.E.2d at 110.
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Shades of the Butler/Allison debate appeared in a civil case during
In Rose the
the survey period in Rose v. Figgie International,Inc.'
trial court granted plaintiff's motion in limine to exclude the testimony
of two defense experts. These experts would have testified that various
psychiatric conditions had led plaintiff to exaggerate and manufacture
her symptoms. The trial court concluded this testimony would be
nothing more than an opinion on the credibility of plaintiff."2 On
appeal, the court of appeals agreed that an expert may not express an
opinion as to whether a witness is truthful. 53 This, however, was not
what the two experts were doing; "[r]ather they diagnose[d] her as
suffering from recognized psychiatric disorders that have caused her to
have or complain of physical symptoms out of proportion to any injuries
she may have experienced." 54 Even the opinion that plaintiff was
malingering was not an impermissible opinion because "malingering is
Thus, the court of
a recognized psychiatric clinical disorder."'
appeals concluded the trial court "abused its discretion in ruling that the
expert testimony as to [plaintiff's] malingering and other psychiatric
disorders was irrelevant and inadmissible."5 6
The previous two evidence surveys have pondered whether the court
of appeals is attempting to fashion a requirement that a party tender an
expert to the court for a ruling that the witness is qualified to give
opinion testimony as an expert.'57 The court of appeals returned to
5
In C.W.D. appellant contended the trial
this issue In re C.W.D."'
court erred when it allowed an expert to testify because appellee did not
tender the witness as an expert until the end of her testimony.'5 9 The
court did not, as it had in previous decisions, state flatly there is no
requirement that a party tender an expert witness. Rather, it said that
if an expert, after first being examined with regard to his qualifications,
proceeds to give expert opinion testimony, the trial court "has tacitly or
impliedly accepted the witness as an expert."6 ° However, there is
"danger in failing to make some overt act of tender of the expert for the

151. 229 Ga. App. 848, 495 S.E.2d 77 (1997).
152. Id. at 855-57, 495 S.E.2d at 84-85.
153. Id. at 857, 495 S.E.2d at 85.
154. Id., 495 S.E.2d at 85-86.
155. Id. at 858, 495 S.E.2d at 86.
156. Id. at 859, 495 S.E.2d at 87.
157. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 47 MERCER L. REV. 127, 141-42 (1995); Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 48 MERCER L. REV. 323, 346 (1996).
158. 232 Ga. App. 200, 501 S.E.2d 232 (1998).
159. Id. at 206, 501 S.E.2d at 238.
160. Id. at 207, 501 S.E.2d at 239.
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record .
*...""''
If there is no tender, an appellate court may not be
able to discern whether the witness testified as a layperson or as an
expert. 162 In C.W.D. none of this was particularly relevant because the
trial court eventually ruled that the witness could testify as an
expert. 63 However, given that the court went to some inconvenience
to discuss the ramifications of a party's failure to tender an expert, it
would seem that prudence now requires trial attorneys to tender their
experts if there is any doubt as to the experts' qualifications.
In Sinkfield v. Oh," the court of appeals grappled with the issue of
when a nonmedical expert can give expert testimony in a medical
malpractice action. In Sinkfield plaintiff sued her treating obstetricians
after she suffered a miscarriage. Plaintiff's medical expert testified to
several deviations from proper care by defendants. In particular, this
expert said the doctors inappropriately prescribed Motrin. Defendants
moved for summary judgment claiming that even if they breached the
standard of care, there was no evidence that their acts proximately
caused plaintiff's miscarriage. In response, plaintiff admitted the
affidavit of a pharmacologist that stated the Motrin was the principal
cause of the miscarriage. The trial court refused to consider this
affidavit because the pharmacologist was not a medical doctor.6 5 Six
appellate judges disagree d. 6 ' The majority noted the pharmacologist's
affidavit was not offered to establish a breach of the standard of care,
but rather was offered to show causation of the injury.167 The mere
fact that his testimony may concern a medical issue did not render him
incompetent to give such testimony. 16 Here, the issue was the effect
of Motrin on the fetus.'6970 A pharmacologist is qualified and competent
to testify in this regard.
Three judges dissented.' 7' They noted first that plaintiff's medical
expert did not testify that any of defendants' alleged breaches of the
standard of care caused the miscarriage.' 72 The pharmacologist's
affidavit, they argued, could not be used to establish causation because
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229 Ga. App. 883, 495 S.E.2d 94 (1997).
Id. at 883-84, 495 S.E.2d at 95.
Id. at 887, 495 S.E.2d at 97.
Id. at 885, 495 S.E.2d at 95-96.
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in their view of Georgia law, "'the causal connection between tort and
injury must result from the negligence of the professional and as the
procedure is of a professional nature, the characterization of the
professional conduct must be by one possessing sufficient expertise in
that discipline.' 173 Moreover, the pharmacologist's affidavit did not
174
elaborate or provide any details of his experience and expertise.
They accused the majority and the special concurrence of dealing in
"speculation," "supposition," and "assumption" to establish his training.'75 The dissent stated "[t]his is nice theory, but it is not a basis for
concluding that this witness is qualified to give his expert opinion on the
medical question of what caused this miscarriage."' 76
Turning to the facts of the case, the dissent noted plaintiff's complex
and involved medical history.7 7 The court stated:
This is not a case in which a normal healthy expectant mother is
suddenly prescribed Motrin 800 and then a miscarriage results.
Although I do not believe that Dr. Proctor would be qualified to
diagnose the cause of the miscarriage in any case, he certainly is not
qualified to diagnose the cause of the
miscarriage in this case
17
considering [plaintiff's] medical history.

IX. HEARSAY
A.

Generally
Georgia has long held the quaint view that hearsay, even if not
objected to, has no probative value. Thus, hearsay evidence admitted
without objection cannot support a verdict on appeal. Last year's survey
addressed the supreme court's opinion in Sharpe v. DOT, 179 in which
the court seemed to renounce this principle.8 ° Apparently, however,
the supreme court now takes a different view. In White Missionary
Baptist Church v. Trustees of First Baptist Church,' the supreme

173. Id. at 892, 495 S.E.2d at 100 (quoting Turner v. Malone, 176 Ga. App. 132, 134,
335 S.E.2d 404, 406 (1985)).
174. Id. at 894, 495 S.E.2d at 102.
175. Id. at 893, 495 S.E.2d at 101.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 893-94, 495 S.E.2d at 101-02.
178. Id. at 894, 495 S.E.2d at 102.
179. 267 Ga. 267, 476 S.E.2d 722 (1996).
180. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 49 MERCER L. REV. 149, 149-51(1997). In Sharp
the Supreme Court reversed longstanding authority allowing a party to move to strike
"illegal evidence." 267 Ga. at 271, 476 S.E.2d at 725.
181. 268 Ga. 668, 492 S.E.2d 661 (1997).
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court reaffirmed that hearsay testimony "'is not only inadmissible but
wholly without probative value, and its introduction without objection
18 2
does not give it any weight or force whatever in establishing a fact.'"
B.

PriorOut of Court Statements

Georgia has two rather unusual rules regarding the admissibility of
prior statements by witnesses. In Gibbons v. State, 8' the supreme
court held that prior inconsistent statements of a witness are admissible
as substantive evidence if the witness is subject to cross-examination. '84 In Cuzzort v. State,'8 5 the supreme court, in apparent frustration over the difficulty of securing convictions in child molestation
cases prior to the enactment of the Child Hearsay Statute,8 6 held that
a prior consistent statement is admissible as substantive evidence
against an accused if the witness is present at the trial and subject to
cross-examination.' 87 The court specifically noted the "statement was
not limited in value to impeachment but was substantive evidence of the
matter asserted." 188
Of course, Georgia has now adopted the Child Hearsay Statute, and
in Woodard v. State89 the supreme court decided to rein in Cuzzort.
In Woodard defendant contended the trial court improperly admitted
evidence of a statement by a child who allegedly saw defendant
molesting another child. Defendant contended, inter alia, that the
admission of the child's statement impermissibly bolstered the credibility
of the child's in-court testimony. The prosecution argued that pursuant
to Cuzzort prior consistent statements of an in-court witness are
admissible as substantive evidence. 9 ° Examining Cuzzort and its
progeny, the supreme court acknowledged that many cases had
"misinterpreted" Cuzzort and this had lead to the improper admission of
prior consistent statements.' 9 ' Cuzzort, the court said, should not be
read to allow the use of prior consistent statements of an in-court
witness under any circumstances.' 9 2 rRather, Cuzzort allows the
admission of prior consistent statements "only where (1) the veracity of

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 669, 492 S.E.2d at 662.
248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982).
Id. at 862, 286 S.E.2d at 721.
254 Ga. 745, 334 S.E.2d 661 (1985).
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (1995).
254 Ga. at 745, 334 S.E.2d at 662.
Id.
269 Ga. 317, 496 S.E.2d 896 (1998).
Id. at 317-18, 496 S.E.2d at 897-98.
Id. at 319-20, 496 S.E.2d at 899.
Id. at 319 n.14, 496 S.E.2d at 899 n.14.

1998]

EVIDENCE

249

a witness's trial testimony has been placed in issue at trial; (2) the
witness is present at trial; and (3) the witness is available for crossexamination."193 The court overruled cases inconsistent with this
rule. 194 The court's pronouncement was clear: "unless a witness's
veracity has affirmatively been placed in issue, the witness's prior
consistent statement is pure hearsay evidence, which cannot be admitted
merely to corroborate the witness, or to bolster the witness's credibility
in the eyes of the jury."'9 5 The court did not address whether testimony admitted under the Cuzzort rule, as clarified in Woodard, is
admissible as substantive evidence. Its opinion necessarily suggests,
however, that it is not. Rather, it is admissible only to bolster the
credibility of a witness who has been impeached.
Although the supreme court complained that its opinion in Cuzzort
had been "misinterpreted to eliminate the need for any inquiry into
whether a prior consistent statement was offered solely for the purpose
of bolstering a witness' credibility in the eyes of a jury,"19 6 the court
surely must shoulder the blame for this misinterpretation. Witness
Smith v. State, 97 in which defendant had the misfortune of seeing his
appeal resolved some six months before Woodard. In Smith defendant
contended the trial court improperly admitted, pursuant to Cuzzort, a
child victim's prior consistent statement. "
The court summarily
rejected his contention noting that the supreme court had "'stated that
inquiry into impermissible bolstering no longer is necessary following
Cuzzort .

. .

.

"9

Thus, defendant's contention alleging a child abuse

investigator's testimony that the victim's out of court statements were
consistent "from one interview to the other was admissible over
defendant's objection as to bolstering." °° The court of appeals holding
is understandable; if, as held in Cuzzort, the statement was admissible
as substantive evidence, then the fact that it "bolstered" a witness was
of no consequence. Of course, under Woodard, such testimony is no
longer admissible, and it would seem to follow that prior consistent
statements are not admissible as substantive evidence.
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The Necessity Exception

The author's previous two surveys chronicled, and warily criticized,
the dramatic evolution of Georgia's newly adopted necessity exception to
the rule against hearsay.2 1' To summarize, hearsay evidence is now
admissible in Georgia if it is necessary and if it is found to be sufficiently trustworthy. It is safe to say that the necessity exception has given
prosecutors, and more rarely defendants, access to hearsay evidence that
would never have been admissible under even the broadest interpretations of previously recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. During the
current survey period, Georgia's appellate courts again allowed
prosecutors liberal use of the necessity exception. °2 Hearsay statements relied upon by criminal defendants, it seems, are generally less
trustworthy than those relied upon by prosecutors.0 3
However, in Welch v. State, °4 the court of appeals concluded the
prosecution went too far in the use of a hearsay statement admitted
under the necessity exception. 0 5 In Welch defendant contended the
trial court improperly allowed a Georgia Bureau of Investigation agent
to read to the jury an unsworn statement implicating defendant. The
person who gave the statement informed the trial court that the
statement was not true and had been given in the hope that she would
not be punished. At trial, however, the witness refused to testify.20 6
The court of appeals held the trial court improperly admitted the
witness's unsworn statement because the "requisite guarantees of
trustworthiness are patently absent ....
During the current survey period, the court of appeals applied the
necessity exception by name in a civil case for the first time. In Lane v.
7Tft County Hospital Authority, °. the court of appeals held a decedent's statement was admissible under the necessity exception because
hearsay evidence of the statement was necessary (the declarant was,
after all, dead) and because the circumstances surrounding the
statement satisfied the trustworthiness requirement of the necessity

201. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 48 MERCER L. REV. 323, 351-54 (1996); Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 49 MERCER L. REV. 149, 169-73 (1997).
202. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 231 Ga. App. 677, 499 S.E.2d 663 (1998).
203. See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 226 Ga. App. 93, 94, 485 S.E.2d 582, 583 (1997)
(statement to defendant's attorney "not made as part of any official investigation" is not
sufficiently trustworthy).
204. 231 Ga. App. 74, 498 S.E.2d 555 (1998).
205. Id. at 77-78, 498 S.E.2d at 559.
206. Id. at 75-76, 498 S.E.2d at 557-58.
207. Id. at 76, 498 S.E.2d at 558.
208. 228 Ga. App. 554, 492 S.E.2d 317 (1997).
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exception.2 °9 In its analysis, the court cited Swain v. C&S Bank of
Albany210 as authority for the necessity exception. 211 This is not
quite accurate. Swain, which was also a subject of a previous survey,
analyzed a decedent's statement under principles relating to dying
declarations.2 12 The necessity exception, although often applied in
cases in which the declarant is dead, is not limited to dying declarations.
The important point of Lane is not that it broke new ground in analysis,
but that it applied the necessity exception to a civil case. If it is applied
as freely as it is in criminal cases, it may be that Georgia lawyers will
find all kinds of statements, formerly clearly inadmissible, admissible
because the declarant is, for some reason, not available.
In Douglas v. State,213 a defendant sought the admission of an outof-court statement that was made during the course of an official
investigation. Defendant's alleged co-conspirator confessed to the crime
and exonerated defendant. Unfortunately for defendant, however, the
co-conspirator fled prior to defendant's trial and thus was not available
to testify.214 Interestingly, the court did not expressly mention the
necessity exception. Rather, it noted that a statement by one codefendant exonerating another is admissible "if the circumstances surrounding the statement provide indicia of reliability and the testimony 215
is
critical to the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation."
Thus, the court imposed on defendants the burden of proving not only
the two elements of the necessity exception but also that the exclusion
of such evidence would impinge his right to confront witnesses against
him.
D. Res Gestae
As discussed above, the res gestae doctrine is often used to justify the
admission of what seems to be extrinsic act evidence. Strictly speaking,
however, the res gestae doctrine is an exception to the hearsay rule.
O.C.G.A. section 24-3-3 defines res gestae as "[d]eclarations accompanying an act, or so nearly connected therewith in time as to be free from
all suspicion of device or afterthought .... ,21. The res gestae doctrine
is used liberally in criminal cases to admit hearsay statements. For
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example, in Taylor v. State217 defendants contended the trial court
improperly admitted a police officer's testimony that a witness to the
alleged crime told the police officer "on the night of the incident" that
one of the defendants stabbed the victim.21 On appeal, the court of
appeals was vague as to precisely when this statement was made, noting
that it was made "shortly" after the incident." 9 Nevertheless, the
court held that the trial court properly admitted the statement as a part
of the res gestae.22 ° Similarly, in Morris v. State,22 ' the court of
appeals noted that it is not necessary that the statement at issue be
made contemporaneously with the act at issue.222 Rather, "the length
the
declaration is not conclusive to the
of time between the event and 22
3
determination of admissibility."
The supreme court seemed to push the envelope of the res gestae
exception in Walthour v. State.224 In Walthour defendant contended
the trial court improperly admitted the hearsay statement of the
deceased victim. At trial, a witness testified that he had watched the
victim place a telephone call to defendant. At the end of the conversation, the victim told the witness that defendant intended to kill him, the
victim, and therefore, he had to "'get"' defendant first. 225 The trial
court admitted this testimony pursuant to the excited utterance
exception to the rule against hearsay.226 On appeal, the supreme court
noted that Georgia's exception for excited utterances is actually a part
of the res gestae exception to the rule against hearsay.227 The court
agreed that the victim was likely startled by the knowledge that
defendant intended to kill him. 228 This conclusion was buttressed, the
court noted, by the witness's testimony that the victim was upset when
he learned of defendant's plan. 229 This, the court held, was sufficient
the victim's statement was
to support the trial court's conclusion that
230
within the excited utterance exception.
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It is ironic that the courts have little reluctance to use the res gestae
doctrine to admit hearsay statements (and extrinsic act evidence) in
criminal cases, yet dig in their judicial heels in civil cases. In the case
of extrinsic act evidence, there is a rational basis for admitting evidence
of other transactions in criminal cases, which typically involve intentional misconduct, and not in civil cases, which typically do not involve
intentional misconduct.
It is not clear, however, why a hearsay
statement admissible as part of the res gestae in a criminal case should
be accorded higher standing than a hearsay statement made under
similar circumstances and offered as a part of the res gestae in a civil
case.
The court of appeals faced this issue during the survey period in the
context of a "slip and fall" plaintiff's attempt to offer into evidence a
statement made at the scene by an unknown employee. The court had
previously addressed this issue in Johnston v. Grand Union Co.231 In
Johnston plaintiff alleged she was injured when defendant's automatic
doors closed on her as she entered defendant's store. To establish
defendant's prior knowledge of the doors' defective operating condition,
plaintiff testified that a redheaded, medium-built female store employee
happened upon the scene and acknowledged that store employees knew
the doors were not operating properly. 32 The court in Johnston
engaged in some rather confusing analysis of the admissibility of
employee admissions against an employer.233
In three separate
opinions the court struggled with this issue and the majority
concluded
23 4
the alleged statement by the employee was not admissible.
The court of appeals returned to this issue during the current survey
period in Hagan v. Goody's Family Clothing, Inc.235 In Hagan plaintiff
slipped and fell because of a wet spot on the floor of defendant's store.
In his deposition plaintiff testified that immediately after he fell a store
employee told him that a child had thrown up on the floor. Defendant
moved for summary judgment, alleging the undisputed evidence
established that it did not have superior knowledge of the foreign
substance that caused plaintiff to fall. Plaintiff responded that the
store's knowledge was demonstrated by the statement of the unidentified
store employee. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary

231. 189 Ga. App. 270, 375 S.E.2d 249 (1998). For a discussion of Johnston, see Marc
T. Treadwell, Evidence, 41 MERCER L. REV. 175, 199-200 (1989).
232. 189 Ga. App. at 270, 375 S.E.2d at 250.
233. Id. at 271-72, 375 S.E.2d at 250-51.
234. Id. at 271, 375 S.E.2d at 250.
235. 227 Ga. App. 585, 490 S.E.2d 107 (1997).
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judgment and plaintiff appealed.236 The court of appeals affirmed,
ruling that the hearsay statement of the unidentified employee had no
probative value and thus could not be used to demonstrate the store's
superior knowledge.237 Relying on Johnston, the court rejected the
argument that the statement was admissible as a part of the res gestae
or as an admission of a party opponent."' With regard to the latter,
the majority said:
"putting forward of some unidentified, unspecific person as an 'employee,' who allegedly made certain remarks that would bind or incriminate
the employer, and as to whom there is no showing the person can be
brought forth at trial or even located, or in fact exists, is not enough to
raise a genuine issue of material fact controverting the defendant's
positive testimony that there was2no
defect of which it had actual or
9
constructive superior knowledge."
In a dissenting opinion joined by Judge Beasley and Judge Eldridge,
Judge McMurray argued the statement was admissible as a part of the
res gestae.24 ° He concluded that a statement made at the scene of an
accident to an investigating officer has long been admissible as a part of
the res gestae. 241 There is no requirement, Judge McMurray wrote,
that the party offering the statement be able to identify the party
making the statement. 242 This can be established
by circumstantial
243
evidence or the testimony of other witnesses.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Judge Beasley focused on the
procedural posture of the case. In the context of a motion for summary
judgment, the court should review the evidence to determine "whether
there is admissible evidence of a declaration against interest or res
gestae statement made by an agent of defendant to prove prior, superior
knowledge of the foreign substance by the proprietor."2"
If the
evidence were viewed in favor of the nonmoving party, as it must be,
Judge Beasley concluded that a jury could draw a reasonable inference
that defendant knew that a child had thrown up on the floor.245

236. Id. at 585-86, 490 S.E.2d at 108.
237. Id. at 586, 490 S.E.2d at 108.
238. Id. at 586-87, 490 S.E.2d at 109.
239. 227 Ga. App. at 587, 490 S.E.2d at 109 (quoting Johnston v. Grand Union Co., 189
Ga. App. 270, 272, 375 S.E.2d 249, 251 (1988)).
240. Id. at 588-89, 490 S.E.2d at 110.
241. Id. at 588, 490 S.E.2d at 110.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 589, 490 S.E.2d at 110-11.
245. Id. at 590, 490 S.E.2d at 111.
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In Watson v. Kroger,24 a court of appeals panel rendered an opinion
that cannot be squared with the full court decisions in Goody's and
Grand Union. In Watson also a slip and fall case, plaintiff sought to
show defendant's actual knowledge of a spill through the testimony of
her grandson who said an unidentified employee told him that store
employees "had been meaning to clean up that area."247 Defendant
argued that, pursuant to Grand Union, this alleged statement by a store
employee was not admissible.248
The three-judge panel disagreed. First, the precise holding from
Grand Union cited by defendant was actually rejected by a majority of
the judges participating in Grand Union.249 Thus Grand Union, the
court continued, actually embraced the principle that a hearsay
statement by an employee is admissible against the employer.250
Moreover, in Watson the grandson's testimony that the statement was
made by a "black male, wearing an apron, who was working in the
produce department putting up fruit,"25 ' coupled with the store
manager's testimony that only one employee met that description,
sufficiently identified the employee.252 Although this employee denied
making the statement, a jury could decide which statement to believe.253
If a clear principle can be derived from these seemingly conflicting
cases, it is that a plaintiff seeking to rely on a statement allegedly made
by an unidentified store employee must describe that employee
sufficiently to allow the store to figure out who the likely employee is.
E. Statements By Co-Conspirators
O.C.G.A. section 24-3-5 provides that a statement by one conspirator
during the pendency of the conspiracy is admissible against his coconspirators. 2 4 As discussed in previous surveys, the co-conspirator
exception to the hearsay rule has often been fertile ground for appeals.
During the current survey period, however, only one co-conspirator
exception case merits discussion. In Ottis v. State,255 defendant was
convicted of the horribly brutal murder of two children and their mother.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

231 Ga. App. 741, 500 S.E.2d 631 (1998).
Id. at 742, 500 S.E.2d at 632.
Id., 500 S.E.2d at 633.
Id. at 742-43, 500 S.E.2d at 633.
Id. at 743, 500 S.E.2d at 633.

251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254.
255.

O.C.G.A. § 24-3-5 (1995).
269 Ga. 151, 496 S.E.2d 264 (1998).
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Some two weeks after the murders, defendant's husband's cousin
testified that the husband confessed that he and defendant killed the
two children. Although the cousin told his mother about the statement,
law enforcement authorities did not learn of the statement until two
years later. Another witness testified that the husband admitted his
involvement in the crime while the two were incarcerated together.
Finally, a third witness testified that almost two years after the crimes
a third co-conspirator told the witness about his involvement in the
crimes."' The court of appeals first concluded there was sufficient
evidence that the three conspirators jointly participated in the murders,
and in acts leading up to the murders, to establish a prima facie case of
conspiracy to commit the crimes.257 The fact that some statements
were made some two years after the commission of the crimes further
suggested a "tacit agreement among the perpetrators to conceal what
they had done."25 Defendant's husband's confession some two weeks
after the crimes did not end the conspiracy because the confession was
not made to law enforcement authorities.259 Even the arrest of the two
conspirators who made the incriminating statements did not end the
conspiracy because they continued
in their efforts to conceal their
60
involvement in the crimes.

However, statements of co-conspirators are not admissible unless they
bear sufficient indicia of reliability. Of the circumstances typically
recognized as indicia of reliability,26 ' only the fact that the statements
were an assertion about a past fact rather than statements of present
facts from which the jury could make its own inferences, suggested a
lack of reliability.262 However, this was outweighed by the fact that
the conspirators had knowledge of the roles of other conspirators in the

256. Id. at 154-55, 496 S.E.2d at 268-69.
257. Id. at 154-55, 496 S.E.2d at 268.
258. Id. at 155, 496 S.E.2d at 268.
259. Id., 496 S.E.2d at 268-69.
260. Id., 496 S.E.2d at 269.
261.
The absence of an express assertion about a past fact; the declarant had personal
knowledge of the identities and roles of the participants and the criminal
undertaking so that cross-examination of the declarant would not have shown that
the declarant was unlikely to know whether the defendant was involved; the
possibility that the declarant's statement was founded on faulty recollection was
remote; and the circumstances under which the declarant gave the statement
suggest that the declarant did not misrepresent the defendant's involvement and
the crime.
Id. (citing Copeland v. State, 266 Ga. 664, 665, 469 S.E.2d 672, 674-75, 1996)).
262. 269 Ga. at 155, 496 S.E.2d at 269.
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commission of the crimes.26 3
Finally, it was unlikely, given the
gruesome nature of the crimes, that the defendants' recollections were
faulty; and because the conspirators implicated themselves as well as
defendant, it was less likely that they fabricated their accounts. 2"
F

PriorTestimony

In In re Billy L. Spruell,265 the trial court held defendant, who was
an attorney, in contempt for his failure to appear at his client's trial. On
appeal, defendant contended the trial court improperly considered the
testimony of his client from a hearing on a motion to continue the
client's trial.266 The court of appeals agreed that this testimony was
inadmissible hearsay for two reasons. First, testimony from a prior
proceeding is generally not admissible unless the witness is unavailable
to testify in the subsequent proceeding. Here, there was no showing of
unavailability.267 Second, prior testimony is generally admissible only
if the party against whom the testimony is being offered had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the prior proceeding.6 6
Defendant was present at the prior proceeding in his capacity as
attorney for the client.269 This, however, did not end the inquiry. The
party against whom the testimony is offered must have had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness on the issue for which
testimony is being offered. 2 "° At the prior proceeding, the issue was
whether the client's trial should be continued. 271 At this hearing,
defendant had no "practical reason" to cross-examine the client about
defendant's conduct. 272
Therefore, the court held the trial court
improperly considered the client's testimony from the prior proceeding
and reversed defendant's conviction. 3
G.

Child Hearsay Statute

In 1995, the Georgia General Assembly amended the Child Hearsay
Statute274 to extend its application to hearsay statements of a child

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. at 156, 496 S.E.2d at 269.
Id.
227 Ga. App. 324, 489 S.E.2d 48 (1997).
Id. at 324, 489 S.E.2d at 48.
Id. at 326, 489 S.E.2d at 50.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (1995).
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witness, rather than just statements by a victim of abuse. This action
was prompted by the supreme court's decision in Thornton v. State,2 75
which held that the Child Hearsay Statute, as it then existed, applied
only to victims of child abuse and not witnesses of child abuse.276 In
Woodard v. State,2 " defendant contended that the 1995 amendment
was unconstitutional. 27" The supreme court agreed, holding that "the
amendment creates disparate classes of identically-situated criminal
defendants, in violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of our State and
279
Federal Constitutions, and thus we are obligated to strike it down."
Other than Woodard, Child Hearsay Statute cases during the survey
period were more routine. For example, in Smith v. State2' 0 defendant
claimed that because the child victim refused to testify when she took
the stand, the victim was not "available to testify" as required by the
Child Hearsay Statute. 21 The court of appeals disagreed. The child's
refusal to testify, the court reasoned, went to her credibility as a
witness.28 2 If a child victim refuses to testify, the jury can take this
into account in its assessment of her credibility.8 3 The court's logic
suggests that a child victim's refusal to testify would diminish her
credibility. While this may be true of witnesses generally, it is unlikely
that a six-year-old victim of molestation would be deemed less credible
by a jury because she was too terrified to testify. Indeed, in Smith
defendant's attorney decided not to attempt to cross-examine the witness
in part because he thought cross-examination would be too "dangerous,"
-not an unreasonable conclusion under the circumstances. 28 4 Nevertheless, the court of appeals's point is well established: the Child
Hearsay Statute does not guarantee effective cross-examination; it only
gives defendants a chance to cross-examine.
The Child Hearsay Statute also requires that the trial court find "that
the circumstances of the [out of court] statement provide sufficient
indicia of reliability."2 8 In Wallace v. State, 8 the court of appeals
reaffirmed that an appellate court, in considering whether a trial court

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

264 Ga. 563, 449 S.E.2d 98 (1994).
Id. at 565, 449 S.E.2d at 105.
269 Ga. 317, 496 S.E.2d 896 (1998).
Id. at 318, 496 S.E.2d at 898.
Id. at 321, 496 S.E.2d at 900.
228 Ga. App. 144, 491 S.E.2d 194 (1997).
Id. at 146, 491 S.E.2d at 196.
Id. at 147, 491 S.E.2d at 196.
Id.
Id. at 146, 491 S.E.2d at 196.
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (1995).
228 Ga. App. 686, 492 S.E.2d 595 (1997).
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properly found indicia of reliability, may consider evidence introduced
subsequent to the introduction of the child hearsay statement.8 7
X.

BEST EVIDENCE RULE

Georgia's best evidence rule provides that "a writing sought to be
proved shall be produced, unless its absence shall be satisfactorily
accounted for."2" If a contract has been reduced to writing then the
"writing is the best evidence of the same."289 In General Insurance
Services, Inc. v. Marcola,29 ° defendant contended the trial court
improperly permitted plaintiff to testify about the terms of the parties'
written contract. However, plaintiff first testified that, despite her
repeated requests, she was never provided with a copy of the contract.
One of the defendants, plaintiff further said, told her that the contract
was lost. Another witness, apparently an agent of defendants, confirmed
that the parties had a written agreement.29 ' The court acknowledged
that the best evidence of the parties' contract would be the contract
itself.29 2 However, a party may rely on other evidence of a contract if
the party can satisfactorily account for its absence. 2"
Further,
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 24-5-2, secondary evidence is admissible if
"the primary evidence for some sufficient cause is not accessible to the
diligence of the party."29 4 Under the circumstances, the court of
appeals held that plaintiff had made a sufficient showing to allow the
trial court to permit the plaintiff to testify about the terms of the
contract. 5
Unlike most best evidence rules, Georgia's rule applies only to
"writing[s]." 29' During the survey period, the court of appeals held
that the best
evidence rule does not apply to tape recordings29 and
298
currency.

287. Id. at 687, 492 S.E.2d at 597.
288. O.C.G.A. § 24-5-4(a) (1995).
289. Id. § 24-5-4(b).
290. 231 Ga. App. 144, 497 S.E.2d 679 (1998).
291. Id. at 145-49, 497 S.E.2d at 681-83.
292. Id. at 148, 497 S.E.2d at 682.
293. Id.
294. O.C.G.A. § 24-5-2 (1995).
295. 231 Ga. App. at 148, 497 S.E.2d at 683.
296. O.C.G.A. § 24-5-4 (1995).
297. Smith v. State, 228 Ga. App. 144, 146, 491 S.E.2d 194, 196 (1997).
298. Johnson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 114, 115, 497 S.E.2d 666, 669 (1998). In Johnson
the court held that the trial court did not err in admitting photocopies of money used in
a drug buy. Id. at 115-16, 497 S.E.2d at 669.

260

MERCER LAW REVIEW
XI.

[Vol. 50

MISCELLANEOUS

State, 299

defendant elicited testimony from an alleged
In Brown v.
accomplice who had pled guilty to charges arising from his role in the
alleged scheme. The witness testified that he alone committed the
offense. On cross-examination of this witness, the State established that
he did not plead guilty to the offense until the day of his trial. The
prosecutor's point was that when the witness initially pleaded not guilty,
This, the court of appeals
he was "'actually lying to the Court.' 3
held, was improper.3 °' Specifically, a defendant who elects to plead
not guilty and thus have his guilt or innocence decided by a jury, but
later elects to plead guilty is not "lying" but rather is exercising his
constitutional rights. °2 The exercise of these rights should not be
construed against that individual." 3 Accordingly, the court of appeals
reversed defendant's conviction." 4
In Pickren v. State, 305 the supreme court sent a strong message
about the use of videotaped re-enactments of crimes. In Pickren the trial
court ruled that the State could use a videotaped re-enactment of the
crime as "'demonstrative evidence'" that could be shown to the jury but
it would not be admitted into evidence as an exhibit that the jury could
take to the jury room.308 On interlocutory appeal, the supreme court
first noted that the trial court's characterization of the evidence as
"demonstrative" evidence was incorrect.307 Demonstrative evidence is
admissible and goes with the jury to the jury room.3 °8 Other evidence
may be used only to illustrate testimony and is not actually admitted
into evidence. 30 9 However, the videotape was not admissible for any
purpose. 310 Before re-enactments of crime are admissible, it must be
shown that the re-enactment fairly and accurately depicts the
events.3"1' Moreover, the court held that a trial court should not admit

299.
300.
301.
302.

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

228 Ga. App. 281, 491 S.E.2d 488 (1997).
Id. at 283, 491 S.E.2d at 491.
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Id. at 284, 491 S.E.2d at 491.
269 Ga. 453, 500 S.E.2d 566 (1998).
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such re-enactments unless they are necessary to explain oral testimony.312 The supreme court was clearly concerned about opening the
door to such re-enactments. The court stated, "if use of such a videotape
by the State were authorized, defendants with sufficient funds would
stage their own re-enactments of what they claim occurred at the time
of the crimes in question ... [tihis would lead to trial by taped reenactments.""'3

312.
313.

Id. at 456, 500 S.E.2d at 570.
Id.

